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TAKINGS FOR GRANTED: THE
CONVERGENCE AND NON-COVERGENCE OF
PROPERTY LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
DENNIS SCHMELZER*
"My own view is that the leftist
voices that have emerged are not going to disappear because we
1
have a property law."

INTRODUCTION
Of the myriad of new laws and regulations promulgated by the
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China
("China") in March 2007, one captured the watchful eye of Western
2
media sources: China's new property law ("Property Law"). One
report described the law as "an important step away from Communist
collective ownership and towards a market economy" that will
"undoubtedly increase protection for home owners and prevent land
seizures."3 Time Magazine was similarly optimistic, emphasizing that
"reforming the old socialist system is exactly the point of the law,
individual property rights being a core tenet of a functioning capitalist
economy."4 As these examples illustrate, Western news coverage has
essentially depicted the law as representative of a major convergence
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1. Joseph Kahn, China Approves Property Law, Strengthening Its Middle Class, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/world/asia/16china.html *quoting Zhu Xueqin, a Chinese historian and government expert).
2. Property Rights Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar.
16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), translated in http://www.lehmanlaw.com/fileadmin/lehmanlaw
_com/laws___regulations/Propoerty_Rights_Law_of_the_PRC__LLX__03162007.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter China's New Property Law]. This is the unofficial
translation of the full law as provided by Chinese law firm Lehman, Lee, & Xu. An official
translation is not yet available.
3. China Passes New Law on Property, BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ asia-pacific/6456959.stm.
4. Simon Elegant, China Gets a Property Rights Law, TIME, Mar. 16, 2007,
http://www.time .com/time/world/article/0,8599,1599932,00.html.
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of Chinese property law with the standards of laws embraced by freemarket economies like the United States.
Of course, given the complexity of property laws, vast differences
remain between the property laws of many Western free-market
states, let alone between the property laws of China and those of the
countries commonly associated with the Western legal tradition.
There is one area in particular, however, in which convergence is
apparent between Chinese and U.S. property law: the law of takings.
While the United States and China have reached similar
solutions to takings law questions, close study of the evolution of this
law in each country suggests that these solutions, while startlingly
similar, are based on different ideological principles and address
radically different problems. This note proceeds to examine how and
to what extent U.S. and Chinese laws have converged in these areas.
Part I sets forth a basic overview of the roots of the law of takings in
the United States and China. Part II examines two recent cases
involving challenges to government takings in the United States and
China to illustrate that the legal solutions to takings law questions
have converged in both jurisdictions. Finally, Part III considers the
institutional, economic, and social forces that have driven this
evolution in both systems.
Ultimately, this note concludes that the convergence upon
similar standards and solutions in takings law is a deceptive unity. If
anything, close study of this legal evolution demonstrates that, while
the United States and China have adopted similar solutions and are
now faced with common problems and questions, this practical policy
convergence has not been accompanied by a convergence of
ideologies or purpose. As such, observers would be wise to look
beyond the common language currently embraced by both
jurisdictions and more closely examine the ideological drivers of the
legal evolution to predict how property law in both jurisdictions is
likely to evolve in the future.
I. U.S. TAKINGS LAW & TAKINGS LAW WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS
While the convergence of property law in China and the United
States may be noted in several areas, the most striking example
involves takings law, or the law that governs when local, state, or
federal governments are allowed to take private property. In the
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United States, takings law is rooted in the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
5
Amendment, which states "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."6 This clause allows for public
takings of private property under U.S. law while also setting
limitations on those takings; any property taken must be for "public
use" and accompanied by "just compensation"—terms that have
guided takings law and have been the source of challenges to it since
7
the Amendment's passage. With amendments to the Chinese
Constitution in 2004 and the recent passage of China's new Property
Law, China has developed a similar takings law.
Government takings are nothing new to China. With the
establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese
government established in law its right to take private property,
confiscating much of the private property held within the Chinese
mainland.8 Indeed, until 2004 the nation's constitution still recognized
the state's right to take private land in the public interest without
compensation. According to Article 10 of the Chinese Constitution,
"[t]he State may, in the public interest, requisition land for its use in
9
accordance with the law." At the same time, the absence of any
mention of compensation in the Chinese text gave the word "taking"
a more literal meaning.10 Widespread abuse of this power by local
authorities led the National People's Congress to amend Article 10 to
read "[t]he State may, in the public interest and in accordance with
law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and make
11
compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned." At the
time, since this guarantee did not provide more guidance, widespread

5. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1093 (5th ed. 2002).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. See DUKEMINER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 1093.
8. See CAO PEI, REAL ESTATE LAW IN CHINA 12 (1998).
9. Amendment to the Constitution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Mar. 14, 2004), art. 20, translated in http://www.npc.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2826.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (P.R.C.) (containing the original text of Article
10 within the amending text of Article 20) [hereinafter Amendment to the Constitution].
10. See, e.g., Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Prop. Rights and Land
Reform in the P.R.C.: Roundtable before the Cong.-Executive Comm'n on China, 108th Cong.
28-29 (2003) (statement of Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. at Kan.
City), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:86630.pdf [hereinafter Overview] (noting that land could be taken by
"government fiat").
11. Amendment to the Constitution, supra note 9, art. 20.

_SCHMELZER_FMT6.DOC

136

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/25/2008 3:28:29 PM

[Vol 19:133

evictions and seizures continued, along with growing protests against
12
those seizures.
In response, key parts of the new Property Law passed in March
2007 go beyond guarantees of compensation for takings to further
13
define exactly what compensation is due. In fact, the Property Law,
officially "an important component part of the civil code,"14 goes into
such depth that its Chinese version contains 247 articles across 40
15
pages. While there is no equivalent federal law defining the contours
of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the Chinese law can
readily be compared with the contours as defined by over two
centuries of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.16
Through such a comparison, a case can be made that Western
media sources are correct: the Property Law, along with its formal
explanation, presents a convergence with U.S. takings jurisprudence.
This is particularly the case considering recent takings jurisprudence,
as exemplified by a comparison of the "Nail House" case in China
with the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New
17
London.
II. PARADIGMATIC CASES: FROM "NAIL HOUSE" TO NEW
LONDON
Prior to the passage of the new Chinese Property Law, one case
had risen to fame throughout the Chinese media as a national symbol
of the struggle of ordinary people against the evictions and
expropriations that had become widespread across China over the
last decade.18 This case, dubbed the "Nail House," involved a husband
and wife in the city of Chongqing who were determined to save their
12. Howard W. French, Land of 74,000 Protests (But Little Is Ever Fixed), N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2005, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/international/asia/24letter.html?oref=logi n.
13. Explanation on Draft Property Law, 5th Nat'l People's Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of
Wang Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the Standing Comm. Of the Nat'l People's Cong.), available at
http://www. 10thnpc.org.cn/english/government/202091.htm [hereinafter Wang Zhaoguo].
14. See id. at § 3(1).
15. Charles Hutzler, China Introduces Landmark Property Law, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 8,
2007, at A13, available at 2007 WLNR 4466275.
16. See, e.g., Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 423-27 (1967) (discussing how civil and common law
systems can be compared as a matter of functional equivalence, as well as some inherent
problems in making such comparisons).
17. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
18. See Lessons from 'Nail House,' CHINA DAILY, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/opinion/2007-04/04/content_843001.htm [hereinafter Lessons].
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home from expropriation without adequate compensation.19 Out of
20
280 residents, they were alone in resisting the eviction order. Their
two-year legal battle to save their property might have gone
unnoticed in China if not for the photographs of their home that
emerged in online sources, which made the building look like a nail
that could not be pulled out of the construction site.21 Its defiant
image captured the admiration of many.22
Ultimately, the Nail House plaintiffs won their fight for increased
compensation through a court-approved settlement after the passage
of the new Property Law.23 Even though the new Property Law did
not technically take effect until October 1, 2007, within a week of the
law's passage the Chinese media had already connected the two.24 As
soon as the National People's Congress made it clear that private
individuals have a right to adequate compensation for resettlement,
the developers got the message and decided it was in their interest to
quickly settle—a move that was seen by many as a major milestone in
Chinese private property protection.25 A former Nail House neighbor
summarized this change with a brief observation: "In the past they
26
would have just knocked [the house] down."
Just as Nail House is seen as a landmark case for takings law in
27
China, Kelo v. City of New London, a Supreme Court case decided
in 2005, is seen as a landmark case for takings law in the United
States. Kelo resulted in a "firestorm of public resentment" from angry
critics who "bemoaned 'the death of private property.'"28 At issue in
Kelo was whether the economically "distressed municipality" of New
London, Connecticut, could condemn and seize fifteen non-blighted
homes as part of an economic redevelopment plan provided that just
19. £260,000 Brings China's Best-Known House Down, TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 3, 2007,
http:// www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1608437.ece [hereinafter House Down].
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Zhang Rui, First Test Case for Newly Approved Property Law?,
CHINA.ORG.CN, Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/204173.htm.
25. See Howard W. French, Homeowner Stares Down Wreckers, at Least for a While, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/asia/27china.html?_
r=1&ref=asia&oref=slogin [hereinafter Chongqing Journal].
26. Id.
27. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
28. Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005,
at B2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/07/AR20051007023 35.html.
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compensation was paid to property owners.29 The Court ultimately
found this to be an acceptable public purpose within the meaning of
30
the Takings Clause.
Ironically, while Nail House represents a rebirth of private
property protection to many in China and Kelo represents the death
of private property to some in the United States, the rule that
emerges from both is surprisingly similar. Indeed, both cases raise
three issues in particular that deserve discussion. First, both raise the
question of what constitutes "public interest" or "public use," and
they arrive at a remarkably similar, albeit controversial, answer.
Second, both raise the question of how to define just compensation.
Third, both involve controversial takings of homes, raising the issue
of what special place homes may have in relation to other properties.
Each of these issues shall be discussed in turn.
A. "Public Interest" and "Public Use"
When asked for the basis of their challenge against the eviction
order authorizing the taking of their house, Wu Ping, the wife of the
property owner, directly questioned the alleged "public interest"
behind the taking, declaring that:
The Constitution and the latest Property Law protect private
property ownership. They said they were going to demolish
our house because it is in the public interest. But they are
going to build a shopping center, which has nothing to do
with the public interest! It is a business move, and what the
[order] protects are the developers' interests!31
These comments hit upon a key question in both the United States
and China: when can property be taken from one private party and
given to another in the name of "public use," "public interest," or
"public purpose"?
Much of the majority opinion in Kelo is dedicated to addressing
this question in U.S. law. As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority:
[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to
another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a
State may transfer property from one private party to
29. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473, 475, 477.
30. Id. at 484.
31. Rui, supra note 24.
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another if future "use by the public" is the purpose of the
32
taking . . . .
While Stevens readily admits that this explanation does not answer
the more complex issues raised by Kelo, it might perhaps suffice to
answer the questions raised in the Nail House case. After all, while
the Wu property was being transferred to private developers, it was
known at the time that a "shopping mall will be built where their
33
house now stands, each floor covering 5,000 square meters." Since a
large shopping center would likely qualify as an establishment for use
34
by the public under U.S. law as Stevens describes above, this would
make the Nail House case less problematic for U.S. law.
If the exact use of the Nail House property was not known,
however, matters would be more complicated. This was the case in
Kelo, which was "not a case in which the City [was] planning to open
the condemned land—at least not in its entirety—to use by the
35
general public." In Kelo, some of the properties taken would not
offer services to the public at large.36 Nonetheless, Stevens upheld the
taking, noting that the meaning of "public use" in the Fifth
Amendment has long since recognized that the term need not mean
literal "public use" and that a mere "public purpose" would suffice.37
Accordingly, while residents of New London believed that the
Constitution's terms meant that "cities have no right to take their
land except for projects with a clear public use, such as roads or
38
schools, or to revitalize blighted areas," Justice Stevens expressed
the Court's opinion to the contrary. Similarly, while Wu Ping felt that
building a shopping center was not in the "public interest," city
officials clearly disagreed.39
Ultimately, Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Kelo held that
the "public use" requirement is met where a city "has carefully
formulated an economic development plan that it believes will
provide appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no

32. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
33. Rui, supra note 24.
34. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (holding that a shopping
center is open for use by the public at large).
35. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 480.
38. Homes May Be 'Taken' for Private Projects, MSNBC, June 23, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn .com/id/8331097/ [hereinafter Homes May Be 'Taken'].
39. See House Down, supra note 19.
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means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue."40 Similarly,
the National People's Congress has also, since 1995, required that all
expropriations in the public interest "must comply with land
utilization master plans"41 and "be subject to strict urban planning,
overall planning, rational distribution, [and] comprehensive
development . . . on the basis of the principle of combining economic,
social and environmental benefits."42 Given this language, it would
seem inapposite whether Nail House was going to be replaced by a
shopping mall open to all or by some other business less open to the
public, as long as it is being taken as part of a plan. Similarly, the
Supreme Court held that full public use of the land was not required
for the takings in New London, Connecticut.43 Instead,
comprehensive plans are paramount to the legality of takings in both
countries, whether those plans involve building conference hotels and
marinas in New London44 or "broad avenues" and "big shopping
malls" in Chongqing.45
That is not to say that this is without controversy in either
country. Just as Wu Ping became a hero46 among "Dingzihu" (those
who resist government seizures for developers without adequate
compensation) for her fight against the conflation of the term "public
interest" with developers' interests,47 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
stinging dissent to the Kelo opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas, has been used by property rights advocates for
making the same point.48 O'Connor charged that,
[T]he fallout from this decision will not be random. The
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with
disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and development firms.
As for the victims, the government now has license to
transfer property from those with fewer resources to those
40. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
41. Administration of Urban Real Property Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 9, translated in 5 THE PRC
PROPERTY SERIES 5, 6 (Asia Law and Practice Ltd. ed., 1995) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Administration of Urban Real Property Law].
42. Id. art. 24.
43. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
44. Id. at 474.
45. Chongqing Journal, supra note 25.
46. House Down, supra note 19.
47. Rui, supra note 24.
48. Homes May Be 'Taken', supra note 38.
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with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse
49
result.
While the concerns expressed by Wu Ping and Justice O'Connor have
not been enough to stop these takings, substantial agreement with
their concerns in both the United States and the People's Republic of
China suggest that the controversy over how to define "public
interest" and "public use" will continue as the law continues to
develop.
B. When is Compensation "Just"?
In addition to raising questions about what constitutes a "public
interest," both the Nail House and Kelo cases raise questions about
whether compensation is "just." In China, what surprised local
housing official Ren Zhongping most with Nail House was that Wu
Ping would not accept the same compensation taken by 280 other
property owners and determined reasonable by an official appraisal
agency.50 As he noted, "[s]he has the value of her house in her heart,
but what she has in mind is not practical."51 These comments refer to
her desire, for instance, to "be compensated with a same-sized
apartment" in the same location with the "same exposure to the
sun."52 This irked developers and city officials alike, who called the
53
demands unrealistic. Yet these concerns are similar to those of the
New London residents who challenged the taking of their homes,
fighting the condemnation of their properties because of their
attachment to things like waterfront views.54
Addressing these concerns, Justice Thomas' dissent noted that
"[s]o-called 'urban renewal' programs provide some compensation
for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the
55
subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced." Yet this
56
is nothing new to U.S. law. Since United States v. Miller in 1943, the
U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the idea of compensating

49. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. Chongqing Journal, supra note 25.
51. Id.
52. Rui, supra note 24.
53. Id.
54. See Charles Lane, Justices Affirm Property Seizures, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/23/AR20050623007
83 _pf.html.
55. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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individuals for the personal value of their property, holding that the
government must only pay fair market value to compensate for taking
57
a property, or "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
58
seller." Housing official Ren Zhongping seemed to believe that this
type of compensation is all that is required by Chinese law as well,
arguing that Wu Ping's demand for compensation beyond a
professional appraisal of market value was "more than what is
59
reasonable by law."
The text of China's new property law, however, suggests that Wu
Ping's demands, while likely unreasonable in the United States
according to five of nine Kelo justices, are more in line with the spirit
of the new Chinese law than Chongqing's officials may think. Article
42 of the new law provides, for instance, that "where [an] individual
residential house is expropriated, the residential conditions of the
expropriated shall be guaranteed" along with "compensations for
60
demolition and resettlement." Of course, this provision turns on
what "residential conditions" means; if apartment size and sun
exposure qualify as "residential conditions," then Wu Ping could be
well within her rights to demand that these conditions are guaranteed.
The official explanation further cites the protection of "living
conditions" as well, including resettlement costs61—neither of which
would be required of U.S. developers seeking to displace tenants.
Instead,
[I]n the United States, residential tenants sometimes get
sketchy relocation assistance when urban renewal comes but
hardly ever are provided with a new home. Their landlords
typically get most of the cash, as the lease contracts either
are terminated before the condemnation or provide that
62
condemnation will terminate the lease rights automatically.
While the United States primarily grants compensation to the person
who owns the land in fee simple absolute, such a solution would make
little sense in China given that most Chinese tenants received only a
permanent right to residence rather than outright ownership of their

57. See id. at 374-75.
58. Id. at 374. See also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, .at 1114.
59. Rui, supra note 24.
60. China's New Property Law, supra note 2.
61. Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 3(6).
62. Patrick A. Randolph Jr., The New Chinese Property Law, PROB. & PROP. 14, 20 (Sept.Oct. 2007).
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homes under the privatizations of the 1990s.63 Accordingly, in the
absence of any well-defined right to ownership, the value of the
property to most Chinese tenants is much more tied to the right of
residency itself.
While the Chinese text might go further in some ways than
current U.S. law to compensate tenants who lose their homes to
takings, it remains to be seen whether this difference will exist in
practice. This is particularly the case if the Nail House settlement is
any indication of how the law will be enforced. After all, Wu Ping,
while receiving greater financial compensation than she was initially
offered, did not ultimately obtain the other conditions she originally
demanded.64 And even though the new property law now provides a
legal basis to challenge compensation in court, it is unclear whether
the majority of Chinese property owners, whose cases are not subject
to as much publicity as Nail House, would be able to wage a
successful case against inadequate compensation. These problems are
further compounded by the lack of a truly independent Chinese
judiciary.65 There may be a reason, after all, that Wu Ping, while
believing the new law was on her side, ultimately decided to settle.
Others, however, may be more willing to test the law in the near
future. Already, there have been reports of "many 'nail houses' that
have sprung up over China . . . since the introduction of a property
66
law last year." Though inspired by Wu Ping's battle to sustain her
own fight, some claim that they will not follow her example in
accepting less than replacement costs.
Choi Chu-cheung, for
example, is a property owner in the city of Shenzhen whose "nail
house" is the last obstacle blocking the construction of a new eighty-

63. See id. at 159.
64. See House Down, supra note 19.
65. See, e.g., Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China's Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
533, 539 (2007). See also Alex Pasternack, Old Beijing Tries to Avoid Wrecking Ball, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://features.csmonitor.com/olympics08/2008/08/14/
old-beijing-tries-to-avoid-wrecking-ball/ (noting that legal expert Su Nan recommended against
bringing takings challenges to the courts "not least because judges are often influenced by the
government").
66. Michael Bristow, Stand-off at Beijing 'Nail House', BBC NEWS, July 16, 2008, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7509614.stm. See also Land Can Still Be Seized, Says
Legal Expert, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 28, 2007, at 4, available at 2007 WLNR 25521767
(noting that, though it is an uphill battle for landowners, "there have been sporadic successes in
disgruntled landowners' fights against property developers" since the new Property Law was
passed).
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eight story tower.67 While Wu Ping ultimately accepted less than
replacement cost, Choi Chu-cheung has claimed that he will hold out
68
until he receives fair compensation or "land of equal value." How
such replacement costs would differ from fair market value, and how
successful citizens are in obtaining those replacement costs, remains
to be seen. What is clear is that, as in the United States, "the real fight
[in China] . . . will be over compensation . . . ."69
C. Home is Where the Heart is
Both the U.S. and Chinese national constitutions separate homes
from other properties as worthy of special mention and protection.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. constitution, for instance,
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures," specifically singling out houses as protected from
unreasonable search and seizure along with papers and other
70
unnamed effects. This Amendment reflects the common law
principle that an individual's home is his or her castle.71 Yet this is not
a purely common law concept; the Chinese constitution of 1982 has a
similar provision which states that "[t]he residences of citizens of the
People's Republic of China are inviolable. Unlawful search of, or
intrusion into, a citizen's residence is prohibited."72 With these
provisions, one might ask whether homes have a significant place in
Chinese and U.S. takings law as well. Given that the two most recent
prominent cases in takings law in the United States and China, the
Nail House case and Kelo, involved takings of homes, these cases
present a good opportunity to question whether the taking of homes
raises additional problems for government takings.

67. See Stephanie Wong, Home Holdout Is New Test of China Property Law, YAHOO FIN.,
Apr. 15, 2007, available at http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/15042007/323/home-holdout-new-test-chinaproperty-law.html.
68. See id.; see also Zhuang Pinghui, 'Nail house' Blogger Is Homeowners' Hope, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at 6, available at 2007 WLNR 8070764 (indicating Choi Chucheung's insistence on fair compensation).
69. Randolph, supra note 62, at 19. See also Pinghui, supra note 68 (reporting several other
instances of disputes over compensation).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
71. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting Buie v. State, 531 A.2d
1290, 1297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)).
72. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 39 (2004) (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) [hereinafter
XIAN FA].
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The taking of homes, while currently allowed by the law of both
countries, is more controversial than other takings and probably more
likely to result in successful legal challenges. Justice Thomas' dissent
in Kelo, for instance, speaks adamantly against "the indignity inflicted
73
by uprooting [individuals] from their homes." What Thomas does
not mention in his opinion, however, is that five of the fifteen
properties involved in Kelo were not homes of those challenging the
74
taking, but rather, properties held as business investments. Thomas
chooses to focus on those properties that are individual homes,
though, as a particularly egregious form of taking. Likewise,
American news articles focus on the taking of homes, also setting
aside the question of the investment properties altogether.75
Similarly, the Chinese media focused heavily in their coverage of
Nail House on the fact that Wu Ping and her husband were seeking to
protect their home, with only passing mention of the fact that the
76
"family used to run a restaurant business from home." Rarely was it
mentioned that a major reason that Wu Ping turned down previous
compensation offers was because "she wanted lower levels in the new
building so she could run her restaurant."77 Yet what sparked national
interest was Wu Ping's fight to keep her home.
The idea that homes deserve special protection under takings law
has not been confined to dissenting opinions or media reports;
instead, U.S. and Chinese law has, at times, been specifically drafted
to offer special protection to homes in recognition of the idea that the
taking of homes is more serious than other takings. One famous
example in U.S. law is the house of Margaret Scattergood, which the
government tried to take in 1961 because its 32.5 acres "jutted like an
iceberg into the tract where the CIA planned its compound" in
78
Langley, Virginia. Since the use of land for a government agency
headquarters was clearly a public use, President Eisenhower and CIA
Director Allen Dulles were well within their authority when they
authorized the government to take the property and pay
79
compensation amounting to $54,189. Not deterred by the President's

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 475 (Stevens, J., majority).
See, e.g., Homes May Be 'Taken', supra note 38.
Rui, supra note 24.
Clifford Coonan, A Chinese Man's Home Is His Castle, INDEP. (U.K.), Mar. 31, 2007, at

42.
78. RONALD KESSLER, INSIDE THE CIA 178 (1992).
79. See id. at 178-79.
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authority, Scattergood lobbied Congress to save her home, and her
story was so compelling to Congressmen that her effort resulted in an
individual law passed by Congress allowing her the right to remain in
her house until her death a good twenty-five years later.80
While an extraordinary event, the Scattergood case demonstrates
a natural reluctance among American policymakers to remove
somebody from his or her home, even for good reason. Chinese
policymakers from 1949 to 1979 did not have such qualms; during this
period the People's Republic of China confiscated hundreds of
thousands of homes across the country through a series of different
initiatives that were part of its socialist transformation.81 By 1979,
seventy-four percent of all urban buildings were state-owned housing
82
units that had been confiscated.
Far from guaranteeing fair housing as intended, these policies, by
the 1980s, had led to overcrowding and poor maintenance of public
83
housing along with an "enormous financial burden on the state."
Since individuals were guaranteed low-cost public housing, they had
no incentive to invest in or build housing for themselves – resulting in
a massive housing shortage.84 To address that housing shortage,
localities began to experiment with privatizing housing to encourage
people to build and invest in their own residences, and "several years
of investigation and experience" led to full-fledged urban housing
reform and privatization as a way to reduce the burdens on the public
housing system.85 As a result of the success of this system in raising
standards of living, the National People's Congress included specific
protections of private housing in the Property Law to further
encourage people to invest in their homes.86 While these provisions
were based on considerations of practical efficiency rather than a
natural reluctance to remove people from their homes, they provide a
legal text that can now be used before a court as an additional reason
to challenge government takings that involve private homes.
That said, their status as private homes, while gaining more
attention in the media, did not ultimately protect Nail House or the
homes in New London from being taken by local governments for
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. at 178-80.
PEI, supra note 8, at 4-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 36.
Id.
See id. at 36-49.
Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 3(5).
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local development projects. Accordingly, while both societies may
single out homes as worthy of additional protection, this "special
consideration" has distinct limitations.
D. A Common Solution: The Lessons from Nail House and Kelo v.
New London
Taken together, the Nail House case and Kelo represent a
convergence in principles of Takings Law between the People's
Republic of China and the United States. Both legal systems now
allow for private property to be taken only if it is for public use and if
the taking is accompanied by just compensation. In addition, both
systems accept the notion that economic development or
redevelopment by private developers is a "public use" justifying
takings provided that economic development is being pursued
according to a comprehensive community development plan. At the
same time, two common problems have emerged: (1) how to define
just compensation; and (2) whether takings of homes should be
treated differently from other takings and subject to greater scrutiny.
As for the first problem, while the text of China's new Property
Law suggests that Chinese compensation for takings should cover
replacement costs of taken property, rather than the American
solution of compensating with fair market value, this potentially more
expansive language has yet to translate to more than fair market
value in practice. As for the second problem, whether the takings of
homes should be subject to greater scrutiny, the most controversial
Takings Law cases in the United States and China in recent years,
Kelo and Nail House, have involved takings of private homes for
economic development projects. This suggests that there is something
about taking homes that is seen as more controversial than takings of
other types of property in both societies, although it is unclear exactly
what effect this really has, if any, on the outcome of these cases.
Once this overall convergence in Takings Law principles is
established, and the emergence of common related questions noted, a
critical question emerges: what is behind this convergence?
III. DIFFERENT DRIVERS, SAME DESTINATION
In comparative law, the appearance of common solutions and
principles in different legal systems often reflects common underlying
problems that those legal systems sought to address. As shall be
discussed in the following sections, this is not the case when it comes
to the development of similar solutions for takings law adopted by
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both the United States and the China. Instead, prior to the recent
convergence of law in this area these countries had remarkably
different legal systems and property-law traditions, which led to
radically different property-law problems. Furthermore, these nations
had very different ideologies for addressing these problems. Each of
these shall be addressed in turn.
A. Distinguishing Constitutional Structures
When China's new Property Law was passed, Western media
heralded it as China's "first law to protect private property
explicitly."87 The material presented so far in this paper, as well as a
reading of the Chinese constitution as amended in 2004, would
suggest that these reports are mistaken. After all, in 2004 the Chinese
Constitution was amended so that Article 13 reads that "[c]itizens'
lawful private property is inviolable."88 Furthermore, the amendment
added that "[t]he State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of
citizens to private property and to its inheritance" and that "[t]he
State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law,
expropriate or requisition private property for its use and make
compensation for the private property expropriated or
requisitioned."89 These provisions certainly seem to amount to a
recognition of private property rights as early as March 2004, three
years before the passage of the new Property Law. So was the New
York Times, along with other Western media sources, negligent in its
research and reporting?
Not entirely. The key to understanding the contradiction
between these reports and the Chinese Constitution's provisions lies
in the differing purposes of the U.S. and Chinese constitutions and
the different weight that is accordingly attached to each in their
respective legal systems. After all, the Constitution of the United
States is explicitly "the Supreme Law of the Land," a position that the
document has held in the American legal system for more than two
centuries.90 By contrast, China does not have the same type of
constitutional tradition. While China has had a formal constitution
since its formation in 1949, the government has replaced that

87.
88.
89.
90.

Kahn, supra note 1.
Amendment to the Constitution, supra note 9, art. 22.
See id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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constitution four times.91 China's first constitution was based on the
1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union and, while "generally
considered as a very positive constitutional document," it "hardly
played an active role."92 While the ongoing disregard for the Chinese
constitutions can in part be blamed on Soviet advisers or the repeated
political upheavals of the Mao era, it is also instructive to note that
the document that preceded it was a political programme passed in
93
September 1949 that set forward the new nation's systemic goals.
In some ways, the Constitution of China today has retained its
nature as a political document and agenda, with a long political
preamble setting forth the current governing ideology that serves as a
94
testament to its political nature. Furthermore, unlike the U.S.
Constitution, which has only been amended twice in the last three and
a half decades,95 the Chinese constitution has been regularly amended
by the National People's Congress in recent years as "the political
and economic situations in China have been changing in a frequent
and rapid way," resulting in changes in party policy that then are
adopted into constitutional provisions.96
Setting aside the Chinese constitution's nature as more
aspirational than the regulatory U.S. constitution, the exact
placement of the property rights protections that were added to the
constitution in 2004 further indicate that these provisions are unlikely
to support a private right of action. After all, while the Chinese
Constitution has an entire section (Chapter II) that defines "The
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens" akin to the Bill of Rights
in the U.S. Constitution, the property rights protections related to
takings are not found within this section.97 Instead, these property
rights are found within a separate section entitled "General
Principles" which includes lofty statements (e.g., "All power in the
People's Republic of China belongs to the people") rather than the
more specific listing of personal rights guaranteed in the fundamental
rights section.98

91. Chu Guobin, Constitutional Law and State Structure, in CHINESE LAW 23, 29 (Wang
Guiguo & John Mo eds., 1999).
92. Id. at 30.
93. Id. at 29.
94. XIAN FA , supra note 72, pmbl.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
96. See Guobin, supra note 91, at 33.
97. See XIAN FA, supra note 72, ch. II (2004) (P.R.C.).
98. See id. ch. I.
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For these reasons, while the 2004 amendments were a step
forward in recognizing property rights, these amendments did little to
change the practical treatment of property law in the absence of
concrete provisions in China's developing Civil Code that more
clearly define private ownership and the contours of those broad
principles of private property protection embraced in the 2004
constitutional amendments.99 In short, the 2004 amendments to the
constitution were akin to the provisions of a non-self-executing treaty:
until they were translated into further implementing legislation, they
had little effect in practice.
B. Common Law versus "Civil Law in Development"
The new Property Law passed in March 2007 was intended to
implement the 2004 amendments to the constitution and, as such, was
100
seen as "an important component part of the civil code." It is
perhaps instructive that virtually all developments in Chinese takings
law come in the form of legislation, whereas most developments in
U.S. takings law come in the form of opinions from the U.S. Supreme
Court. Accordingly, it is worth exploring how China's developing
civil law system and U.S. common law traditions require different
institutional drivers of reform.
Key to the difference between U.S. and Chinese legal systems is
the role of the judiciary. China, by adopting a civil law tradition, also
"adopts the principle of legislative interpretation" and "entrusts the
NPC Standing Committee with the power to interpret the
101
Constitution and laws." Officially, Chinese courts have "the power
to implement (not to interpret) the law,"102 much like civil law courts
in the West are expected to apply, rather than interpret, the
provisions of the civil code. Yet it is exceedingly hard for courts to
implement general principles without some judicial interpretation, so
that "the more detailed an interpretation . . . is given by the
legislature, the easier it becomes for the court to implement."103 This
contrasts sharply with the common law tradition of the United States,

99. See ZOU KEYUAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 83 (2006).
See also Pasternack, supra note 65 (quoting a legal expert who explains that "[o]fficials
generally follow administrative rules in demolition cases that do not conform to constitutional
property rights").
100. See Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 1.
101. Wang Guiguo, The Legal System of China, in CHINESE LAW, supra note 91, at 1, 19.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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which often relies on judicial interpretations to settle the meaning of
the law when challenges arise – and which often results in the
104
evolution of the law over time.
That is not to say that Chinese law does not "evolve" over time,
but rather that it can only formally evolve through the activity of the
political branches of the Chinese government. Accordingly, the
political pressure resulting from the vast changes sweeping Chinese
society led the National People's Congress to issue a string of laws
relating to property and land use over the past decade to provide the
105
courts with laws and interpretations to implement. Yet even before
the new Property Law formally took effect, the National People's
Congress announced that it would begin deliberation over a new
urban and rural planning law to further reform the planning process
that results in the comprehensive development plans used to justify
takings.106 So while U.S. litigants continue to challenge the principles
involved in takings law following Kelo, the National People's
Congress continues to refine its version of takings law through its own
deliberations.
C. The Role of the Media in Encouraging Reform
Given the fact that Chinese property law primarily evolves
through its political rather than judicial branches, one cannot
understate the importance of political pressure to further encourage
reforms of Chinese property laws. One also cannot understate the
significance of the Chinese media in creating that pressure for change.
This significance may seem strange to those familiar with the degree
to which the Chinese media is controlled by the Chinese government;
the Chinese government often suppresses media stories that could
potentially cause a negative reaction against its policies, as
exemplified by the Chinese government's attempt to force its
"mainstream media . . . to abandon coverage of the 'nail house'" in
107
Chongqing. Thanks to a determined group of bloggers and "citizen
journalists," however, the story remained in the national spotlight

104. See, e.g, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202-27 (1973)
(describing the evolution of property law in the United States).
105. See generally Administration of Urban Real Property Law, supra note 41 (publishing
translations of a number of these laws and regulations relating to property).
106. NPC to Deliberate Draft Urban, Rural Planning Law, CHINACOURT, Apr. 14, 2007,
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=4177.
107. Pinghui, supra note 68.
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leading up to and pressuring the passage of the new Property Law.108
Ultimately, the news coverage even led the developers and local
officials to give in to the building pressure before the new law even
came into effect.109 Some Chinese activists, like Shenzhen property
rights advocate Zou Tao, believe that this media attention will not
110
"ultimately lead to a solution for ordinary citizens." As he argues,
"[n]o other similar land disputes will receive that much attention
again. The couple were [sic] rich and could afford to fight the
developer. Most ordinary citizens don't have that many resources."111
What Zou Tao ignores is that the Nail House case "has caused a
112
major stir in academic and civic circles." As China Daily noted in a
commentary on lessons learned from the case, Nail House added to a
growing awareness among Chinese citizens of their rights and
"unquestionably set an example of [people] standing up for their
rights."113 Indeed, since the developers in Chongqing credit not only
Wu Ping's media coverage but also her knowledge of the law for her
victory, it is possible that, through her example and others like it,
other citizens will start to understand the law and to challenge the
114
Chinese government and developers further.
Furthermore, while the Chinese property activist Zou Tao points
out that Nail House is unique because the couple involved is "rich
115
and could afford to fight the developer," the same factors come into
play in challenges to takings in U.S. law. While the U.S. system on its
face allows anyone to challenge government takings, the U.S. appeals
process is expensive and therefore practical realities dictate that only
those who are wealthy enough to afford a potentially protracted legal
battle can effectively mount a challenge to takings of their property.
Of course, even having enough money to mount a challenge to the
taking of their properties and plenty of media attention did not help
the residents of New London keep their properties.116 However, the

108. Id. See generally Dan Southerland, China's Media Controls: Could Bloggers Make a
Difference?, CHINA BRIEF, Apr. 18, 2007, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/
cb_007_008.pdf (discussing the role of bloggers and "citizen journalists" in modern China).
109. See Pinghui, supra note 68.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Rui, supra note 24.
113. Lessons, supra note 18.
114. See Rui, supra note 24.
115. See Pinghui, supra note 68.
116. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
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media attention, as in China, did create enormous political pressure.117
As a result,
Members of Congress have expressed their disapproval and
30 state legislatures have taken action on bills and
constitutional amendments proposing limits on the power of
eminent domain. Governors in three states have declared
118
moratoriums on property seizures.
Accordingly, while media pressure was not enough to influence the
Court's decision in Kelo, the media responses to the Court's ruling
have sparked a political and academic debate across the country
much like Nail House has sparked a debate across China, and the
products of that national debate may very well influence how the
Court approaches the issue in the future.
D. Differing Traditional and Historical Roots of Property Law
Once one understands what processes have been behind the
evolution of the property laws of the United States and China over
the last few decades, it is important to look at the traditional and
historical roots of property law in each country to understand what
problems the law has been evolving to address. As an overall
examination of these histories and traditions shows, by the late 1980s
the United States and China faced very different problems in
property law. Yet these different historical and traditional roots, as
different as they are, set the path for their legal convergence.
As comparative real estate law expert Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.,
asserted before the U.S. Congress in 2002, "Until 1988, there was one
simple law of real estate in China—the government owns
everything . . . there were no individual rights in land and any
arrangements that had been made could be unmade by government
fiat."119 This was no secret; the 1982 Constitution specifically stated
that all urban land belonged to the state, "merely confirming an
120
existing situation which had developed gradually since 1956." This
ability of the state to take control of land without compensation was
standard process for a quarter of a century. By contrast, for nearly
two centuries American property law rested on the "[b]asic building
block of . . . perpetual and relatively comprehensive [private]

117.
118.
119.
120.

Coleman, supra note 28.
Id.
Overview, supra note 10, at 28.
PEI, supra note 8, at 8.
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ownership" known as the "fee simple absolute."121 Essentially, this is a
legal fiction that assumes that complete title of ownership dates back
to antiquity and stretches forward to the present, resulting in
complicated local property recording systems that track the sale of
property from one owner to another going back, in some cases, to
before the nation's founding.122 As one would expect, the Chinese
government, with its history of land takings and redistribution, does
123
not espouse any similar claim of perpetual ownership.
As mentioned above, the U.S. tradition of fee simple absolute is
based in part on fiction. After all, while the United States has had two
centuries of property-law protections for its citizens, the United
States, as a relatively young nation, can hardly trace its established
property rights back to ancient times as can, perhaps, its English
common law parent. Instead, the land of the United States was
acquired in its own series of takings from Native Americans before
and after the nation's founding. This is exemplified by the 1823
124
Supreme Court case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, which involved two
competing land claims in the State of Illinois.125 The plaintiffs had
purchased title to the land from the chiefs of Native American tribes
in the area who, according to the Court, "were in rightful possession
of the land they sold," while the defendants, by contrast, had later
126
purchased the same properties from the United States government.
Despite the usual American rule that an earlier purchase from a
legitimate property-holder should be the more valid title, the Court in
Johnson ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring that "[c]onquest
gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny."127
With this basic history in mind, the current privatization of
China's land after more than 26 years of "conquest" and seizures by
the Chinese government may not be that different from America's
own property foundations. As Gerald Korngold, a professor at New
York Law School and former dean of Case Western University
School of Law, summarizes,
Resolution of undocumented and imperfect land claims in
favor of ordinary American settlers at the dawn of the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Overview, supra note 10, at 29.
Id.
See, e.g., Overview, supra note 10, at 28; PEI, supra note 8, at 8.
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 588.
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American Republic was a necessary predicate to social and
political stability . . . [T]he American government's
validation of these land claims created property rights in
average Americans that financed economic development
and growth. While there are clear historical, economic and
cultural differences with China, the lesson of the American
experience is worth remembering as the Chinese address
128
issues of land ownership and government action.
While China's past seizures and current privatization may have
parallels with the state of American property law at the nation's
founding, by the late 1980s the United States and China had legal
traditions that looked very different from each other, and these
differences were evident in the problems each nation faced.
By the 1980s, after 26 years of nationalization of property, the
inefficiencies in the centrally-planned economy's land allocation and
129
utilization were quite apparent to the Chinese leadership. With all
land in the state's hands, individual Chinese citizens had little
incentive to invest in developing that land, leaving huge burdens on
the state that could not be met.130 Accordingly, the Chinese
government began to experiment with land privatizations to provide
incentives to people to more efficiently develop the land. Wang
Zhaoguo of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress explained that since "the people's living standards ha[d]
continued to improve" under these initiatives, the National People's
Congress subsequently passed the new Property Law to further
stimulate the "people's initiative to create and accumulate wealth and
to promote social harmony."131
The United States, by contrast, hardly lacked clear property
protections. Instead, the problems the United States faced in the
1980s were those of distressed municipalities like New London whose
attempted plans for economic redevelopment and rejuvenation were
often stymied by a few private property owners that refused to sell
the land needed for redevelopment. What happened in New London
is a good example of this problem; while the city won the right to take
the properties of the several remaining holdouts in the end, by the
time the city was able to defeat the challenges to the taking, "builders
128. Gerald Korngold, Letter to the Editor, China's Land Seizures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2006, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/24/opinion/l24china.html.
129. See PEI, supra note 8, at vii.
130. Id. at 36.
131. Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 3(5).
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who once considered projects [had] moved on, deterred by the
controversy," leaving a "site [that] is now a flat expanse of dusty,
132
rock-strewn soil dotted by the few remaining houses." With Kelo
established, however, local governments can now be more sure that
they will be able to secure the land they need for economic
redevelopment, even if that comes at the expense of private U.S.
property owners having a little less security in the perpetual nature of
their titles.
In short, the United States and the People's Republic of China
by the late 1980s had nearly polar opposite property law systems, as
well as nearly opposite problems. China had no institution of
property protection and was learning that having some would
stimulate economic prosperity, while the United States had a deeplyrooted institution of strong property protection and was moving
toward reducing those protections for the sake of economic
prosperity. Somehow, however, these distinct problems resulted in
convergence upon a very similar Takings Law solution.
IV. THE NON-CONVERGENCE OF GOVERNING
IDEOLOGIES: A DECEPTIVE UNITY
Given the convergence of some property-law standards between
the People's Republic of China and the United States, it is easy to
assume that there has been convergence in ideology as well. A
cursory glance at the changing political statements of China's top
leaders might support such a view.
After all, on July 31, 1951, Mao Tse-Tung proclaimed before a
group of assembled party leaders that "We are now carrying out a
revolution . . . in the social system, the change from private to public
133
ownership . . ." This, of course, was not unique to Mao: as Karl
Marx wrote over a century earlier in 1848, "the theory of the
Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of
134
private property." Yet in March 2007, half a century after Mao
declared the beginning of his campaign to eliminate all private
property, the National People's Congress passed a law firmly
protecting private property in the People's Republic. As Wang

132. Lane, supra note 54.
133. QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG 26 (Foreign Language Press, 1st eng.
ed. 1966).
134. KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 18 (David
McLellan ed., Samuel Moore trans., Oxford University Press 1992) (1848).
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Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, explained on the floor of the National People's
Congress at the time, "[e]ffective protection of private property of
citizens is not only . . . what the Party stands for, but also the general
135
From these
aspiration and urgent demand of the people."
statements, it would seem that the Chinese Communist Party has
abandoned communism in its embrace of private property and
adopted the values of the capitalist West. Yet looks can be deceiving.
If China's Constitution is any guide to the political aspirations of
136
the country's leadership, its sizable Preamble declaring that "the
Chinese people . . . will continue to adhere to the people's democratic
dictatorship and the socialist road" and that "class struggle will
continue to exist within certain bounds for a long time to come"
should not be ignored.137 Reconciling the two sets of statements is
fairly easy: while the Chinese Communist Party recognizes the
important gains that privatization has brought and seeks to encourage
those gains as its people's living standards improve, its goal of a
socialist, classless state has not changed. China may have introduced a
new law protecting private property, but the Chinese name of its
ruling party, literally translated as "the public-property party," has
not changed.138
While on the surface it may seem like "the party [only] pretends
fealty" to the principle of public ownership,139 it is entirely possible for
the Chinese Communist Party to "balance[] the principles of a
socialist government with the necessity of providing for private
ownership as an engine for economic growth."140 Similarly, there are
few that would claim that the U.S. has abandoned its ideological
attachment to protecting private property rights by endorsing
eminent domain as part of development plans.
Indeed, the facts dictate that public property remains strongly
entrenched in Chinese society, where most farmland has remained
under collective ownership since the Cultural Revolution and farmers

135. Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13.
136. As it almost exclusively is. See discussion supra Part III.A.
137. XIAN FA, supra note 72, pmbl.
138. See Property rights in China: China's Next Revolution, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10-16, 2007, at
9 [hereinafter China's Next Revolution].
139. See id.
140. Dennis M. Horn & Kai Yang, Riding the Chinese Juggernaut: Rewards and Risks,
PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 9, 12.
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only hold short term leases on their land.141 Even if the Property Law
dictates that such leases will be automatically renewed when they
142
expire, the law does not specify for how long or at what price.
Moreover, "even outside agriculture it is often unclear whether a
'private' enterprise is really owned by individuals or by a local
government or party unit,"143 just as urban tenants, though given
permanent occupancy rights in the 1990s, have never been given
actual ownership rights over their apartments or the land that they
are built upon.144 As such, public ownership is still dominant in many
ways in modern China.
Clearly, the People's Republic of China has not adopted the
American legal fiction and ideology that property is a natural and
perpetual right worthy of government protection, as was proposed by
English theorists like John Locke. Instead, the Chinese Communist
Party has merely decided to protect private property rights as a
practical solution to past failings in centrally-planned investment. As
such, while "the Property Law embraces concepts that are similar to
familiar American concepts,"145 these concepts should not be confused
with ideological goals. Similarly, the United States, in embracing
eminent domain as a method of economic rejuvenation, has not
embraced the idea of the general welfare above the protection of
individual property rights, an idea still embraced by the Chinese
Constitution. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has merely chosen to
expand over time its conception of what types of "public use" justify
takings as a means of addressing the practical problems faced by its
own distressed municipalities.
Although faced with vastly different legal systems, historical and
traditional backgrounds, and social and economic problems, the
United States and China converged upon a common solution in
takings law, partially obscuring the world of differences it took to get
to that solution. While both countries may have reached a common
solution to takings law questions, however, it is important to
remember how they reached those solutions, what forces led to this
convergence of standards, and what forces remain opposed to these
changes. In recent years, the United States and China have distinctly
141. See China's Next Revolution, supra note 138.
142. Gregory M. Stein, The Chinese Land Use Right: Is It Property?, PROB. & PROP., Sept.Oct. 2007, at 22, 25.
143. China's Next Revolution, supra note 138.
144. Randolph, supra note 62, at 19.
145. See Horn & Yang, supra note 140, at 10.
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taken a step closer toward reconciling very different systems of
property. That said, anyone assuming that this convergence is
complete, continuing, or irreversible would do well to reconsider that
assumption.

